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Abstract 
 
Employee-owned businesses have recently enjoyed a resurgence of interest as 
possible ‘alternatives’ to the somewhat tarnished image of conventional investor-
owned capitalist firms. Within the context of global economic crisis, such alternatives 
seem newly attractive. This is somewhat ironic because, for more than a century, 
academic literature on employee-owned businesses has been dominated by the 
‘degeneration thesis’. This suggested that these businesses tend towards failure – they 
either fail commercially, or they relinquish their democratic characters. Bucking this 
trend and offering a beacon - especially in the UK - has been the commercially 
successful, co-owned enterprise of the John Lewis Partnership (JLP) whose virtues 
have seemingly been rewarded with favourable and sustainable outcomes.  This paper 
makes comparisons between JLP and its Spanish equivalent Eroski – the supermarket 
group which is part of the Mondragon cooperatives. The contribution of this paper is 
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to examine in a comparative way how the managers in JLP and Eroski have 
constructed and accomplished their alternative scenarios. Using longitudinal data and 
detailed interviews with senior managers in both enterprises it explores the ways in 
which two large, employee-owned, enterprises reconcile apparently conflicting 
principles and objectives. The paper thus puts some new flesh on the ‘regeneration 
thesis’.  
 
Keywords 
 
Alternatives in recession, cooperatives, degeneration thesis, employee-owned firms, 
Eroski, John Lewis Partnership, Mondragon, mutuals, regeneration thesis, worker 
cooperatives 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the start of the global financial crisis in 2008, there has been a massively 
increased interest in, and reference to, possible ‘alternative’ forms to conventional 
investor-owned firms. Prominent among these alternatives has been the employee-
owned enterprise. In Britain, the central example par excellence of this tendency has 
been the advocacy of the ‘John Lewis Model’. In Spain – and of course beyond – 
Mondragon has attracted renewed interest.  
 
Prominent politicians from all the main political parties in the UK have advocated the 
John Lewis model as a possible ‘answer’ to failures in the prevailing system of what 
has been termed ‘irresponsible capitalism’. Likewise, it has attracted attention 
internationally. The John Lewis Partnership (JLP) has existed since the 1930s but has 
not always been so lauded and celebrated as it is today. Its current commercial 
success (which contrasts markedly with many conventional competitors) and its 
distinctly different ownership structure and other associated core features, encourage 
politicians and other influential commentators to extol JLP as a ‘model’ for others to 
follow. This has added to the new allure of employee-owned firms. Yet, not so long 
ago, the mutuality model was generally regarded as old fashioned, anachronistic, 
dowdy and restrictive. This view impacted, for example, the Cooperative Society in 
the UK as it lost market share to commercial competitors. The downbeat mood was 
reflected also in the de-mutalisation of the building societies and other institutions. 
This retreat from mutualism was seen as a form of modernisation. A similar sceptical 
view was also applied to the John Lewis Partnership for a number of years prior to its 
revival by new approaches (examined below) beginning around the year 20001.  
 
Now, under current circumstances, the twin attributes of ‘principled’ businesses and 
commercial success in a landscape strewn with organisations exhibiting neither of 
these, has made the John Lewis model look extraordinarily attractive.  
 
Likewise, there has been renewed interest in Mondragon. This is in part because the 
Mondragon cooperatives point to a working alternative, and in part because of the 
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 See, for example: The Independent (1999) 'Outlook: Disastrous to Demutualise John Lewis', 7th 
August. 
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historically better relative performance of the Mondragon cooperatives during 
previous recessions (Bradley and Gelb, 1983, 1987; Morris, 1992; Arando et al., 
2010; Basterretxea and Albizu, 2010). There was also a low failure rate of businesses 
in the group during previous decades (Ellerman 1984; Smith 2001; Arando et al. 
2010). However, the vulnerability of the Mondragon cooperatives to market forces 
was made evident by the recent dramatic failure of its domestic white goods 
manufacturer, Fagor Electrodomésticos. In October 2013 it announced it was forced 
to default on payments. The Cooperative Group in the UK with businesses in retail, 
banking, insurance, funerals and other businesses based on a consumer ownership 
model has faced similar economic challenges.  
 
Mondragon’s largest cooperative, the retailer Eroski, is of focal interest to us here 
because it serves as a comparator for JLP. For many decades, the history of Eroski has 
also been a history of success and growth, rising from 88 employees in 1969 to 
52,711 in 2008. Nevertheless, Eroski’s commercial performance has been under strain 
since 2008. This has been due to overall reduced consumer spending for the sector as 
a whole, increased competition from the low-cost retailers, and the weight of large 
investments made by Eroski just prior to the crisis. In response, Eroski managers have 
sought to ameliorate its financial difficulties by a series of sometimes controversial 
measures such as closing subsidiary stores, firing many non members, increasing 
working hours of members and reducing wages of both members and non members. 
As a result its reputation has taken a hit.  
 
Given these varied fortunes of two large co-owned retailers, it is all the more 
necessary to understand how managers in the two selected cases have steered their 
respective paths through the divergent tendencies of degeneration and regeneration 
which figure so prominently in the literature on employee owned businesses. 
 
The degeneration thesis was advanced by the democratic socialists, the Webbs, at the 
end of the nineteenth century (Potter/Webb, 1891; Webb and Webb, 1920). Analyzing 
the evolution of different cooperative production societies in Great Britain during the 
nineteenth century, Beatrice Webb (nee Potter) found a record of commercial disaster 
and repeated failure. The few organizations that survived, she argued, quickly 
‘degenerated’ by moving away from their democratic roots. This occurred in different 
ways such as: employing a growing percentage of outside labour; concentrating 
power in managers’ hands; selling parts of the company to outside shareholders; and 
disqualifying members from taking part in decision making and governing bodies. 
This view that cooperatives are bound to fail or to degenerate into capitalist forms of 
business has remained prevalent in the literature on employee owned firms for close 
to a century (Meister, 1974, 1984; Ben-Ner, 1984; Miyazaki, 1984).  
 
The cooperative degeneration process has been traceable in Mondragon (Kasmir, 
1996; Cheney, 1999; Errasti et al. 2003; Bakaikoa et al. 2004; Luzarraga et al. 2007) 
mainly because of the nature of the growth strategy followed in recent years and the 
consequent increase in non-members in the workforce. The level of member 
participation in the Mondragon group as a whole reduced sharply from 86% in 1991 
(Moye, 1993) to 29.5% in 2007 (Altuna, 2008).  
 
However, in line with authors who contend that degeneration is not inevitable and 
who argue that cooperative ‘regeneration’ can take place (Batstone, 1983; Estrin and 
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Jones, 1992; Stryjan, 1994; Cornforth et al. 1988; Cornforth, 1995; Hernandez, 2006), 
recent research on Mondragon highlights that a cooperative regeneration process 
could be slowly reversing the degeneration (Azkarraga et al. 2012). While 
degeneration via reduction of membership rates has been more extreme in Eroski than 
in other cooperatives of Mondragon, Eroski has also played a leading role in the 
introduction of a number of innovative cooperative regeneration programs which will 
be described and explored below. Similarly, in JLP, there have been periods when the 
democratic experiment lost momentum and episodes when there has been concerted 
effort to breathe new life into the representational forms (Flanders, 1968; Bradley and 
Taylor, 1992; Cox, 2010).  
 
Our work seeks to add light to this degeneration-regeneration see-saw within the 
contemporary context of an unusually prolonged economic recession with a slow 
recovery, by examining the workings of the biggest cooperative in the Mondragon 
group alongside the largest employee-owned business in the UK.  
 
While recent widespread misgivings about investor owned firms (IOFs) provide the 
trigger for renewed interest in employee ownership, our prime purpose here is not to 
make direct comparisons between them and employee-owned firms (EOFs). Rather, 
the focal objective of this paper is to shed light upon how managers in two major 
EOFs in Spain and the UK handle the tensions between commercial viability and 
employee interests.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section presents a brief comparative 
profile of the two organizations, following that, we review literature relevant to 
understanding the nature, tendencies and management problems in employee-owned 
firms. This is followed by an outline of the research methods used in the project 
reported here and that in turn is followed by a presentation of results. The final section 
is devoted to discussion and conclusions. 
 
John Lewis Partnership and Eroski – Summary 
Profiles 
 
The John Lewis Partnership (JLP) is a UK retailer with two major business units: 
John Lewis department stores and Waitrose supermarkets. In the 1930s the founder, 
John Spedan Lewis, took the highly unusual step of giving away a large portion of his 
business to his employees by placing his shares in a trust using an ‘irrevocable 
settlement’ (Spedan Lewis, 1954). Article 7 of the Constitution states: 
 
The Partnership’s ultimate purpose is the happiness of all its members through 
their worthwhile and satisfying employment in a successful business. Because 
the Partnership is owned in trust for its members they share the responsibilities 
of ownership as well as its rewards – profit, knowledge and power. (JLP 
Constitution, as printed in Spedan Lewis, 1954, p. 222) 
 
The stock as a whole rests with the Trust; whether this amounts to ‘ownership’ or 
even ‘co-ownership’ in any strict sense is a moot point. Allocating responsibilities to 
beneficiaries in this way represents a modified form of Anglo-Saxon Trust law. 
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The founder also created a governance system, set out in a Constitution that was, and 
remains, both commercial in orientation and, in the founder’s own terms, 
‘democratic’. Indeed he referred to JLP as ‘an experiment in democracy’ (Spedan 
Lewis 1948). The extent to which it can truly be described as a vibrant democracy in 
practice is another area for debate. In the founder’s words: 
 
In the John Lewis Partnership, democracy, the sharing of power, has been 
carried out as far as is practicable. If other people can see how to do it better, 
let them start another partnership and show how far they are right’ (Spedan 
Lewis, 1954) p. 10. 
 
Partner voice is based on a series of elections to representative bodies. There are three 
governing authorities: the Partnership Council (elected representatives of workers), 
the Partnership Board (includes appointed senior managers) and the Chairman. The 
fact that the Partnership is not answerable to shareholders or the City is seen as a key 
feature which allows its senior managers to make decisions free from short-term 
constraints. The organisation summarises its character as follows:  
 
The John Lewis Partnership's 91,000 Partners own the leading UK retail 
businesses - John Lewis and Waitrose. Our founder's vision of a successful 
business powered by its people and its principles defines our unique company 
today. The profits and benefits created by our success are shared by all our 
Partners (JLP 2014) 
 
As noted, such has been the commercial success in terms of growth, quality of 
service, customer and staff satisfaction and other measures that it has become 
fashionable to call for widespread emulation and indeed no less than the promotion of 
a ‘John Lewis Economy’. This is a turnaround indeed. 
 
Eroski S.Coop was founded in 1969 as a result of the merger of ten small consumer 
cooperatives located in the Basque Country. In the early 1990s, Eroski began a 
regional expansion to other parts of Spain, opening new hypermarkets and acquiring 
many supermarket chains. Sales in Mondragon’s Retail Area grew at an average 
annual rate of 14.4% annually from 1991 to 2008. As a result of this expansion, 
Eroski Group became the biggest company in Mondragon and the third largest food 
retailer in Spain. This growth path has changed since 2008 as a result of the economic 
crisis. There have been difficulties in renegotiating debt and this has resulted in high 
financing costs.  At the same time there have been historic falls in consumer spending 
and a decline in value of Eroski’s real estate.  
 
Eroski is a consumer cooperative with special by-laws that give consumer-members 
and worker-members equal representation on its elected governing bodies. There are 
two governing authorities: the General Assembly and the Governing Council with 
both consumer and worker members being represented on each. The chairman’s 
position is occupied by a consumer member. The main business of the Eroski Group 
is concentrated in hypermarkets and supermarkets, although the Group has diversified 
into new businesses as can be seen in the Table 1: 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Comparison of the Two Cases  
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 John Lewis Partnership Eroski Group 
   
Sales  €11.4bn €6.6bn 
Number of stores 39 department stores;  
288 supermarkets plus a 
growing range of outlets in 
petrol station forecourts 
and other settings plus 
some international 
expansion. 
103 hypermarkets; 983 
supermarkets, 197 Eroski -
Travel agencies; 60 petrol 
stations; 37 sport stores 
274 drugstores (Plus 490 
franchised supermarkets) 
Employment numbers 91,000 permanent staff 
(employee owners plus 
some contracted staff) 
43,496 (14,065 employee 
owners) 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on Company Annual Reports (JLP 2013; Eroski 2011). 
  
Definitions of ‘cooperatives’ and ‘worker-cooperatives’ vary. Few commentators 
regard JLP as a cooperative while accepting that Eroski and other Mondragon 
enterprises fit this label. Yet, in a number of respects, JLP displays cooperative 
features. The World Declaration on Worker Cooperatives provides an extensive 
definition, the key features of which include: voluntary membership, democratic self-
management, work undertaken by these members in pursuit of job creation and 
maintenance, striving for quality of life of members and for community development 
(ICA 2005). Eroski and JLP share many of these characteristics with the notable 
exception of the community development aspect in the case of JLP which is in this 
respect much more clearly described as a ‘partnership’ working for collective self-
interest. Notably, in his writings about the partnership, the founder talked about his 
‘experiment in industrial democracy’ as a form of ‘producer-cooperation’ (Spedan 
Lewis 1954). Current JLP managers do not describe the enterprise as a cooperative, 
nor do we seek to do so; rather, the essential indicators are the core ideas of 
representative structures, co-ownership and profit sharing.  Or, as the Constitution 
succinctly states: the sharing of knowledge, profit and power. 
Literature on employee-owned businesses  
 
As noted in the introduction, the literature on employee-owned firms has been 
dominated for more than a century by the ‘degeneration thesis’ (Potter, 1891; Webbs 
1920; Meister, 1974, 1984; Ben-Ner, 1984; Miyazaki, 1984; Bonin, Jones et al. 1993). 
According to this view, mutuality is always a transient phase on a deterministic 
trajectory either away from mutuality in order to prioritise commercial goals, or 
towards further mutuality and accompanying commercial failure. Such a view posits 
an opposition between employee-owned firms and effective management, suggesting 
that any constraint on managers’ ability or authority to manage reduces management 
efficiency, and thus the firm’s performance.  
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Degeneration may result from different dynamics2. Some cooperatives start to deny 
membership status to parts of the workforce. This may occur as cooperatives take on 
temporary staff without membership rights, or they outsource certain activities, or 
they acquire conventional capitalist firms (overseas or locally) with working 
conditions and working arrangements very different to that of an employee-owned 
parent company (Defourny, 1999; Errasti et al., 2003; Bakaikoa et al., 2004). A 
further type of erosion of the cooperative ideal stems from what has been termed ‘goal 
degeneration’. Cooperatives may increasingly prioritize profits or growth as their 
prime purpose. Additionally, there may be ‘organizational degeneration’ when power 
and control are increasingly concentrated in a few oligarchic hands (Cornforth, et al. 
1988; Cornforth, 1995).  
 
According to the degeneration literature, cooperatives and other democratic 
associations often have a ‘life cycle’ in which degeneration takes place progressively. 
Meister (1974, 1984) describes this process of erosion as occurring in four stages. In 
the first, idealism and commitment are high, decisions are made in the assembly, but 
economic activity is poorly established; second, a period of transition during which, if 
the cooperative survives, conventional principles of organization are adopted, initial 
idealism slowly gives way to indifference and the power of management is reinforced; 
third, degeneration signs are many, democracy becomes restricted to a representative 
board, cooperative values are subordinated to economic ones; fourth, members and 
their representatives lose all their power and managers assume total control.  
  
Hence, managers of cooperative firms, it is argued, face a distinct challenge unlike 
that experienced by managers in conventional companies. They are expected to 
submit to continuous and critical internal scrutiny and control by cooperative 
members. This, together with controlled differential salaries between workers and 
managers, may make recruitment into the managerial cadre of worker cooperatives 
problematic (Eccles, 1981; Morales 2004; Basterretxea and Albizu, 2011a). It has also 
been suggested that managers coming from investor-owned firms find it difficult to 
adapt to the culture and values of the cooperatives. As a consequence, they may 
experience difficulties in their relations with employees and, perhaps most of all, with 
the Governing Councils (Bataille-Chedotel and Huntzinger, 2004). Such external 
managerial recruits have a greater tendency towards short tenure (Chaves and Sajardo, 
2004). Some authors suggest that such managers may have difficulties with worker 
participation and that they may undermine the influence of worker-owners and are an 
impediment to cooperative success (Meek and Woodworth, 1990). Thus, managers 
themselves may be a potent source of the degenerative effect (Spear, 2004; Münkner, 
2000; Davis, 2001).   
 
The literature also points to a number of other limitations and challenges facing 
cooperatives including problems in accessing capital (Novkovic 2007; Van der Krogt 
et al 2007) and, risk aversion (Park et al 2004) (Domar, 1966; Vanek, 1970; Spear, 
2004). In other words, the literature tends to suggest a host of reasons why 
commercial success might not be expected in cooperatives.  
 
                                                 
2
 Some types are not applicable to our cases. For example, employee-owned firms can become victims 
of their own success as members sell their shares if they are free to do so (Cornforth et al., 1988, 
Rothschild and Whitt, 1989). In neither JLP nor Eroski is this possible. 
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But many authors (Batstone, 1983; Cornforth, et al. 1988; Estrin and Jones, 1992; 
Stryjan, 1994; Cornforth, 1995; Hernandez, 2006) have argued that cooperative 
degeneration is not inevitable; cooperatives can also regenerate. These authors stress 
that regeneration takes place in cooperatives with a culture of open criticism and 
discussion (Cornforth, 1995) and where there is an active and explicit commitment of 
members to change their organization (Stryjan, 1994). Lending empirical support to 
this optimistic view, Batstone (1983), using data from  French cooperatives, found 
that besides surviving in market terms, these cooperatives maintained a high degree of 
democracy. Batstone suggested that Meister’s life cycle model was too pessimistic 
and he proposed a new life cycle model of three stages progressing from initial 
enthusiasm, through a progressive decline of primitive democracy and the recruitment 
of non-members along with an increasing gap between managers and members; to a 
third stage of ‘resurgence of democracy’ (Batstone, 1983, 152). Similar results were 
found by Estrin and Jones (1992), and Hernandez (2006) argued that cooperatives are 
neither fully democratic nor oligarchic, and should be understood as ‘a site of 
unresolvable contestation between oligarchic and democratic forces’. From this 
literature, internal contradictions and tensions described by the degeneration and 
regeneration literatures do not necessarily lead to resolution, but rather are 
everlasting.  
 
Using our two comparative cases we seek to dig deeper into the actual processes 
constituting this contestation in order to reveal how managers handle it and how they 
themselves reflect upon it.  
 
Research Methods 
 
While recognising the nature of the forces identified in the literature on employee 
owned enterprises of the kind discussed above, we want to pay close attention to how 
the incumbent band of managers in Spain and the UK interpreted their duties and their 
objectives. Hence, our underlying orientation was to try to gain advantage from a  
methodological approach based on critical realism (Archer 1995) and naturalistic 
inquiry (Lincoln and Guba, 1995). We wanted to recognise the interdependence of 
structure and agency. So, while to an extent we drew upon a common framework of 
issues constructed from the literature, we also drew on our extensive background 
knowledge of both cases which extended over ten years. We gave weight to agents’ 
understandings in a manner not reliant upon positivist methods. The initial 
comparative framework was iterated between the two research teams in the UK and 
Spain and then applied to JLP and Eroski. But, the actual conduct of the latest field 
research phases in both Spain and the UK was pursued by both research teams 
seeking most keenly to understand in a comparative perspective how the managers in 
these enterprises interpreted their situations and how they acted. 
 
In the most recent phase of our work with John Lewis, interviews took place between 
2010 and 2013. Interviews were conducted with members of the main board (known 
as ‘The Partnership Board’), and also with members of the main management boards 
of John Lewis (department stores) and Waitrose (supermarkets). Further interviews 
took place with senior managers in finance, logistics, human resource management 
and other central functions. A total of 25 managers were interviewed some of them 
more than once. All interviews were recorded and transcribed. Further, we were 
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allowed access to the archives and from these a very detailed timeline was constructed 
which revealed variations in business policy and democratic arrangements over time. 
Additionally, we were able to observe managerial and board meetings. 
 
In Eroski, the research drew upon extensive knowledge of the Mondragon enterprises 
as they had been researched by the local team over many years (Albizu and 
Basterretxea, 1998; Basterretxea and Albizu, 2010, 2011a, 2011b; Basterretxea, 2011; 
Basterretxea and Martínez, 2012). Additionally, for this specific comparative project 
of these two retailers, a common framework was developed and a common set of 
interview topics explored. Interviews in Eroski took place between November 2012 
and February 2013. Eight interviews were conducted with senior managers. We 
placed a special focus on the human resource, organization and member’s 
mobilization areas of management. In order to gain a matching longitudinal view for 
the case of Eroski we also interviewed the former president for the period 1995-2011 
and used the data emerging from 3 conferences held between 2011 and 2012 with the 
currently serving president, the chief executive officer and the former president. Each 
of these interviews and events were recorded, transcribed and used in the research. 
 
In addition to the interviews, relevant company documents were consulted in both 
enterprises and comparative data assembled.  
Results 
 
We analyse the cases in terms of two main critical aspects of these ‘alternative’ forms. 
Both aspects will help shed new light on the notion of tendencies towards 
‘degeneration/regeneration’. The first of these points of focus is on purpose. This 
means examining what informants thought their organisations were ‘for’. The second 
point of focus is upon the ways in which managers tried to achieve their objectives 
with special attention paid to the implications of their actions for the principles on 
which these employee-owned businesses were based.  
Making sense of organisational purpose 
 
Cooperatives and related bodies are ‘alternatives’ only if they pursue different goals, 
maintain different structures and/or pursue goals in different ways (using different 
procedures and modes of decision making. In this section, we focus on alternative 
purposes in the sense of the struggle to find a place for something other than, or 
additional to, the pursuit of profit. A related aspect is who this work is for: that is, 
who is a member? 
 
What is the ultimate purpose? 
 
Central to the recent performance success of the JLP is a clear sense of purpose 
among executives and managers. The dominant coalition of senior managers refute 
the opposition between the purposes and principles of cooperatives and commercial 
success: indeed they insist that the principles can, with good management, be the 
means towards achieving commercial success. In terms of the history of the JLP such 
clarity may seem surprising – an achievement - given the founder’s apparently 
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deliberate ambiguity.  He defined the ‘ultimate purpose’ of JLP as ‘the happiness of 
all its members through their worthwhile and satisfying employment in a successful 
business’ (Spedan Lewis, 1948). This could be interpreted as a coherent statement of 
purpose. But while some actors within the system choose to emphasise the member-
benefits aspect, others give emphasis to the imperative of a ‘successful business’. 
Hence, there is, in practice, an ongoing debate about whether the right ‘balance’ is 
being maintained.  
 
That approach, as noted, is challenged by senior managers who seek to argue that 
partner benefit (happiness) is inextricably tied-in with successful business. The 
current Chairman asked the question of his colleagues: is the purpose of the 
partnership to be ‘Nicer or Better?’ (than rival firms). The emergent consensus among 
the senior team was to argue that it is both better and nicer and that each of these 
qualities feeds-in to the other. The partnership advantage has to be leveraged so that 
committed and involved ‘co-owners’ make exceptional efforts and provide 
exceptional service (which in the main they do).  
 
Not all managers accept this formulation: some believe there is an ongoing tension 
between two principles (commercial success and partner benefit) and that part of 
managers’ jobs as temporary custodians of the partnership is to strike that balance 
while facing constantly changing vicissitude in the marketplace. If that balance is not 
struck then degeneration of the ideal will ensue. Managers are paid to avoid that while 
simultaneously operating a competitive business. So, how competitive should it be? 
Reflecting the original constitution, current JLP principles state that: 
 
The Partnership should make sufficient profit to sustain our commercial 
vitality and distinctive character, allow continued development and distribute a 
share of profits each year consistent with partners’ reasonable expectations 
(JLP Strategy 2014; and Spedan Lewis, 1948 p.222) 
 
For some members this self-evidently means not seeking to maximise. However, 
some managers argued the necessity to keep pace with competitive rivals or risk being 
diminished. How the Partnership did business and treated customers, staff, and 
suppliers, was, and would remain, different and distinctive. Consider the following 
reflections of a director:  
 
I have to compete against Tesco, I have to compete against their prices. I can 
have wonderful product and I can do all these things, but of themselves they 
will not be enough. Around the year 2000 we were making an operating profit 
of 3%. On the basis of a 3% operating margin we could only open one or two 
shops a year. So, on a yearly basis we were going backwards in terms of 
comparative space. Hence, I see absolutely no conflict at all between the JLP 
model and the push for competitive success… it always comes back to: so 
how do you use the model to gain some kind of competitive advantage? 
(Senior Director 1 JLP) 
 
This analysis is crucial: the JLP ‘model’ and its component elements (consultation, 
quasi-democratic processes, representation, strong shared values, shared profits) was 
regarded as important in itself and important instrumentally as a source of advantage. 
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Current senior management argue that the components of the model must be made to 
work for the success of the business and it is management’s job to ensure that the cost 
of the various components of the model are recovered through increased performance. 
The engaged partner (employee) motivated and committed because of the JLP model, 
would in consequence, treat the customer in ways which enhanced profitability – this 
was the Partner-Customer-Profit cycle in action.  But, for the model to work, they 
insist, requires skilful managerial practice.  
 
In Eroski, management was defined by some informants as indeed about managing 
tensions. Some managers argued that the potential conflict between social and 
business goals was avoidable:   
 
‘Everyone knows we are results-oriented, and some people think you can’t be 
aiming at two things at once. But, I think that orientation towards results and 
people are compatible, not contradictory. I think we have to keep looking for 
results, because this is a business. The first thing is that we are a business. We 
can have a great project, but if we don’t get it profitable, is worthless. But we 
are not as capitalist firms. In a cooperative the result is for us, things are done 
by people for people… the result is for the cooperative members.’ (Eroski 
Manager 1) 
 
Of course there are risks, one of which is failing to give due weight to cooperative 
principles:  
 
There have been times in our history when the business side weighed more 
than the social side. Then, you start to forget your differential elements based 
on cooperative principles, and by the time you realize this you find you are 
acting like conventional firms. (Eroski Manager 2) 
 
 
As in JLP, managers in Eroski identify their model as one that provides the potential 
for gaining competitive advantages, but this potential is only converted into real 
advantages if managers are able to manage specific requirements of the model: 
 
Our model is a very powerful platform to gain advantage. We have consumers 
and worker owners in our governing bodies, the two most important 
stakeholders for the sustainability of the company. This gives us more power, 
but managers need to know how to handle it, because managing this model is 
arduous. Being a cooperative does not give by itself a competitive advantage, 
it gives you on a platform to get this advantage. (Eroski Manager 3) 
 
So, in key respects with regard to underlying purpose, the two organizations are 
similar.  
 
A related issue concerning purpose is who is, or who ought to be, a member? Who 
benefits? 
Who is a member? 
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If everyone who works for the enterprise is a co-owner with similar rights and 
privileges then the idea of joint enterprise is relatively clear.  Matters become more 
complicated if some workers are members and others are not. If tranches of work are 
‘outsourced’ to non-members, this raises questions about identity and boundaries. Co-
owners begin to take on the character of employers/owners who employ other workers 
– thus re-inventing the capital-labour divide. The way in which this core issue is 
raised and resolved reveals much about underlying views of strategic purpose. 
 
Most of the cooperatively owned stores of Eroski Group are in the Basque Country 
and neighbouring provinces. In 2011, 80% of the employees in the cooperative parent 
company were cooperative working members. But this ownership pattern is not 
replicated in other parts of Spain. According to Arando et al. (2010), in the early 
1990s, Eroski felt it was too slow and complicated to expand by using cooperative 
legal structures. It expanded by developing other employment models in its 
subsidiaries. One mode of expansion was through the acquisition of a number of 
conventional firms with no employee ownership.  An additional model of expansion 
was developed: a group of firms known as GESPA which have only partial employee 
ownership. This GESPA model was created in 1997 with the intention of replicating 
aspects of the cooperative model into some of the subsidiaries of the group. This 
employee ownership plan involved about 5,600 employees in 2011 (16% of non 
cooperative working members of the Eroski group). Other cooperatives of Mondragon 
have considered imitating this approach. The VII Congress of Mondragon in 2003 
approved a new corporate expansion policy for its cooperatives, encouraging the 
participation of employees in subsidiaries following the Eroski-Gespa model (Altuna, 
2008). However, the GESPA model wasn’t capable of following the growth path of 
Eroski and now is considered as an incomplete model3.  
 
The evolution in time of those different employment models can be seen in table 2.  
 
Table 2: Evolution of different employment models in Eroski (2000-2011)  
 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Cooperative working 
members 6,321 6,834 7,207 7,506 7,835 8,053 8,062 8,177 8,426 8,935 8,229 8,463
Employees with partial 
employee ownership 
(GESPA) n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 4,632 4,713 5,154 6,307 6,468 6,350 5,602
Employees without 
ownership n.d n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 18,609 19,877 37,227 37,972 32,136 28,436 27,769
Total employment 18,188 22,067 23,837 28,351 30,455 31,294 32,652 50,558 52,705 47,539 43,015 41,834
% of cooperative 
working members 34.8% 31.0% 30.2% 26.5% 25.7% 25.7% 24.7% 16.2% 16.0% 18.8% 19.1% 20.2%
                                                 
3In the 2005-2008 Strategic Plan of Eroski, the group made a positive evaluation of the GESPA model, 
but at the same time acknowledged that “it is an incomplete model. It is as if it were a cooperative, but 
is not.” According to Arando et al. (2011) GESPA stores have lower membership rates (61%) than 
stores of the cooperative parent company; average individual owned stakes by GESPA members 
(2,500€) are significantly lower than average stakes of cooperative worker members in supermarkets 
(26,000€) and hypermarkets (33,295);  and members of GESPA have fewer opportunities to participate 
in decision making.  
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Source: Authors’ analysis based on Annual Reports and Social Responsibility Reports of 
Eroski (2002; 2007; 2010-2013; 2002-2013) 
 
So, in 2011 just 20.2% were full members and 33.6% had partial ownership in   
GESPA subsidiaries. Some informants argued that this low ratio indicated a move 
away from founding principles. 
 
This move to employing non-members was also found within the John Lewis 
Partnership even though by no means on the same scale as in Eroski. This 
phenomenon has occurred in particular areas: IT outsourcing, diversification into new 
smaller formats in deals which often entail working with other companies, contract 
cleaning, and some parts of transport and logistics. The move to e-commerce has 
implications for the growing numbers of non-partner employees: contract staff are 
cheaper and more flexible. They may be brought in-house for special short-term 
projects or some operations may be outsourced to India on account of cost. A similar 
logic has operated with regard to the 3,500 cleaners in JLP stores. These are 
outsourced to specialist cleaning contractor companies as is the norm in the industry - 
a decision which has caused some soul-searching for the partnership.  But cost is not 
the only factor. The logistics function with its transport and distribution centres 
employs many non-partners. This has been used to access the knowledge and 
expertise which global logistics firms can bring and to take advantage of lower-cost 
employment practices. Likewise, experimentation with multi-channel and multi 
format customer offers has led to opening JLP in motorway service areas and other 
non-conventional settings. Overseas ventures can be added to this list. These varied 
arrangements lead to mixed forms of partner-non-partner working arrangements.  
 
Besides going against cooperative principles, growing with different business models 
has created some positioning problems for Eroski. While John Lewis and Waitrose 
stress in their communication that employees are partners, and also other retail 
cooperatives in Italy and Great Britain communicate broadly their cooperative nature 
to customers and try to build a competitive advantage using the cooperative 
difference, that didn’t happen in Eroski’s expansion. As one informant acknowledged: 
 
‘I believe that most Spanish customers don’t know that we are a cooperative, 
and we haven’t told it to customers neither. We don’t say to our customers that 
we are a cooperative’ (Eroski Manager 1). 
 
While some informants consider this lack of communication of the cooperative nature 
to customers as a deficit, others justify this policy as a conscious decision, arguing 
that the ‘coop’ image is not ‘modern’ and that previous coop failures in other sectors 
as in the building industries is an obstacle to portraying a contemporary, commercial 
and customer-oriented image. Conversely, in Britain the worker-owner notion 
attached to JLP has market appeal. 
 
The issue of non-member workers has become a very important issue in Eroski in 
recent years and the company is now making a conscious drive to ‘re-cooperativise’. 
It was argued:  
 
We started our ‘cooperativization project’ because we wanted our 
management practices to be consistent with our principles... Among the 
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considerations we made in Eroski, one had to do with our model: the 
inconsistencies arising from having worker/owners in one part of our business 
and only workers elsewhere. We believe that a cooperative is the best model to 
develop a business and develop people. (Eroski Manager 2) 
 
Both JLP and Eroski management display a vigorous interest not only in ensuring that 
the mutual model delivers commercial advantage but also in monitoring (and when 
necessary modifying) the balance between commerciality and principles. Debate 
about membership goes to the heart of the decisions on the purpose of the 
organisations – for whom, and for what, do these organizations exist? It was evident 
that managers in both enterprises were willing to justify certain specific departures 
from the member-only pathway.  
 
In the next section we study how managers reconcile competing principles and 
priorities.  
Achieving purpose: Managing in a mutual 
 
JLP senior management contend that not only are the principles of the Partnership 
compatible with commercial success, they actually contribute significantly to such 
success - but only when management actively intervenes to ensure this linkage. 
Mutuality on its own does not assure success. Many respondents argued that an earlier 
generation of managers had presided over complacency and neglect: ‘Through the 
1990s and into the early 2000s, the business had stagnated under the leadership at the 
time and we just kept turning the handle on one way of doing things’ (JLP Manager 
5).  So, the business had to ‘go through an accelerated period of modernisation and 
catch up with the best of the competition’.  
 
Of what does this ‘modernisation’ consist? For some informants it meant that ‘Now 
we are very clear that management make the decisions’ (JLP Manager 5). But, for 
others that is too crude a statement. While managers have certainly become far more 
ambitious, informed, and assertive, they also understand managing in the partnership 
context to be of a different order, it requires an ability and indeed a desire to engage 
with the workforce, to listen to their ideas and to convince and carry them through the 
changes required.  
 
Over the past 15 years, JLP has undergone significant change. Rigorous business 
planning using performance metrics that are little different from those used by 
conventional retailers was introduced. An increasing proportion of middle/senior 
management appointments are from outside the Partnership. These newcomers have 
introduced challenging new ideas. Sometimes, the outsiders were ahead of their time 
and they were forced out. Occasionally, the ideas they brought were ahead of their 
time and they might be adopted at a later date.  Enormous investment in refurbishing 
stores and expansion has resulted in growth of sales and of staff. E-commerce takes 
an increasing share of sales.   
 
This assertive management strategy is associated with dramatic business performance. 
Since 2008, JLP has consistently outperformed its competitors. During this recent 
period, some of the core institutions of the JLP model have undergone change. Some 
critics object that these changes represent a degree of ‘dilution’. Managers claim they 
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represent ‘modernisation’ in the face of increasing size and competitive (cost) 
pressure. We found different interpretations about the current state of the democracy 
in JLP. It is not too difficult to mount a case which seems to show a dilution of the 
democracy. The number of senior posts dedicated to the ‘Critical Side’  
(institutionalised checks and balances at director level) has been reduced over the past 
decade from five to just one, and the critical edge of the company magazines which 
Spedan Lewis introduced has, in recent years, been muted. 
 
JLP and Eroski managers may differ on where they would draw the line beyond 
which employment model changes and which modes of action would represent a 
fundamental breach of the core principles. But, they agree that there is a line and they 
would agree that these issues require constant attention and debate: they see the 
benefits and they see the risks. Soul-searching and concern was evident: 
 
A Waitrose convenience store in a Shell petrol station run by partners? Yes, I 
can get my mind around that. The Boots model [Waitrose goods in a retail 
chemists chain] is just product supply, really so again no real problem for me.  
We haven’t got any partners involved so I can get that as well.  But, I am not 
so comfortable with the idea of a Shell petrol station run by a Sri Lankan 
family working God knows how many hours and just paid the minimum wage. 
If you try to build the partnership model into that, it just doesn’t work.  But I 
can get my mind around the partner model being slightly different in different 
environments. (JLP Manager 3) 
 
The concession to a ‘slightly different’ version of the model is revealing. Equally 
revealing is the evident mental struggle between what variations or stretch of the 
model to accept or challenge. 
 
In Eroski, as in other cooperatives of the Mondragon Group, cooperative members 
participate in equity, in results and in management. Participation in management takes 
place at two levels: participation in governing and advisory bodies, and day to day 
participation at the level of shop operations. This last type of participation was, 
according to our informants, severely reduced during the growth and expansion period 
between 1995 and 2008, with a rising grade of centralization of decision making in 
central offices to simplify growth and search advantages of standardization, efficiency 
and economies of scale. Reduction in participation was also caused by complacency 
of partners : 
 
‘When things were going well, in good times, participation was much lower. 
Because business results were good, partners did not question business 
decisions.’ (Eroski Manager 4) 
 
Together with this lower involvement of members, some informants mention that 
participation and discussion became bitter because many members were dissatisfied 
with the way that the balance between social goals and business goals was being 
managed:  
 
‘In 2008, we made a self-critical reflection we called "social mobilization." In 
this self-criticism we saw that in the boom years, while we had record 
financial results year after year, we also had major conflicts at the Annual 
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General Assembly, where we received very fierce criticism from working 
partners. In our reflection we concluded that we had been very results-oriented 
…Many partners didn’t attend meetings, they didn’t participate much in day to 
day decisions, and they didn’t care too much about information of the 
cooperative, and then complained at the General Assembly.’ (Eroski Manager 
1)  
 
A key process of any self-managed organization is the reproduction of an active 
membership (Stryjan, 1994), something that was difficult in Eroski in its rapid 
expansion phase. It was argued: 
 
When we grow we have to incorporate people who think cooperatively and we 
must couple them to a cooperative model and to cooperative practices. When 
Eroski grew too fast it was very difficult to incorporate all this. The current 
crisis has given us a number of lessons on how our growth model has to be, on 
how we must combine business growth with ideological and corporate growth 
(Eroski Manager 4) 
 
Thus, we see managers from both JLP and Eroski seeking to correct for past neglect 
of democratic aspects and seeking to persuade themselves that this form of renewal is 
also good for business.  
Initiatives directed at cooperative renewal 
 
In both organizations the achievement of an appropriate balance between commercial 
success and maintenance of the core principles was a subject of open discussion and 
review. The result in both organisations was a process of periodic readjustment and 
‘renewal’. For example, in 2005, Eroski took part in the Mondragon corporate self-
reflection debate entitled Reflection on the Meaning and Future Directions of the 
Cooperative Experience. In this reflection, Mondragon concluded that there had been 
a loss of an explicit ‘cooperative identity’. It decided that it was necessary to update 
and renew cooperative practices (Azkarraga, et al. 2012, 84). According to our 
informants, reflections at the Eroski Group level reached similar conclusions, and 
many of the cooperative regeneration practices implemented in the 2005-2009 and 
2009-2013 Strategic Plans of Eroski have their roots in those reflections.  
 
A program with the aim of bringing decision-making power to the stores was 
launched. Employees of each store began to organize their work schedules in a 
participatory way; they had more power to decide how to deal with complaints from 
customers, and how to solve common logistic problems at the shop level. The process 
of ‘empowerment’ can be seen with regard to both consumer members and 
employees. For example, with regard to consumers there was the creation of 
consumer participation forums in 2006. Then, for employees, there was the 
conversion in 2012 of two subsidiaries in second-degree cooperatives and the 
conversion of 4,142 employees to full cooperative membership. This 
‘cooperativization project’ will be offered to other subsidiaries. Crucially, this project 
is seen not simply as renewing the principles of the cooperative but also as a way of 
achieving a differentiation strategy compared with competitors and gaining 
competitive advantages.  
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As with JLP, the Eroski case shows that cooperative ‘degeneration’ can be reversed.  
 
In the next section we move from management to governance.  
Developing and maintaining purpose: governance processes 
 
A risk for cooperative democracy, as illustrated by both Eroski and JLP, is that the 
greater complexity and size of the business makes the participation of non-
management partners on the governing bodies more difficult. Informants in Eroski 
emphasized that any working member can stand for election and be elected as one of 
the members of the governing council. But a close look at the profile of the working 
members elected for the governing council during the last few years challenges this 
optimistic point of view. Prior to reforms in 2012, five of the six elected council 
members were middle managers. In the renewed Eroski council, all six working 
members are managers (3 supermarket managers and 3 hypermarket managers). 
Informants mentioned as reasons a combination of self-selection and peer-selection 
due to the complexity of the tasks. A similar bias occurs in JLP.  
 
Eroski is also a consumer cooperative and half of the members of the governing 
council are consumer members. According to informants, fear of ‘enemies’ entering 
the governing council of Eroski through the figure of consumer members drives the 
cooperative to closely monitor the nomination and election of consumer members. 
This monitoring process has generated an inbreeding of consumer members’ 
selection. Further, Eroski allocates some of the places on the governing council which 
in theory are reserved for consumer members in the governing council, for outside 
non-executive directors (mainly managers of other Mondragon cooperatives). If many 
consumer members on the governing council of Eroski are senior managers from 
other Mondragon cooperatives there is a risk that they may not be genuinely 
independent. And yet on the other hand, informants suggested that those outside 
directors are often the most critical and challenging. 
 
Overall, the results suggest that the core themes of investigation which drove the 
research – questions about ultimate purpose, about who was a member and who 
should benefit, and how to counter degenerative tendencies - were indeed all very live 
issues in both case organizations. Senior managers were alert to them and had taken 
steps to handle them. In the next section we reflect upon the ways they had done this. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
Economic crisis, revelations of unethical practices and the broad negative socio-
economic impact of investor-owned businesses have stimulated a renewed interest in 
‘alternative forms’ such as those represented by JLP and Eroski. In the case of the 
John Lewis Partnership most especially, continued sales growth and generally 
positive news has been implicitly ‘explained’ by the fact that it is described as an 
‘employee-owned’ firm. This has led to wide endorsement of the John Lewis model.  
In the case of Eroski, its economic fortunes took a dip in 2008 and it has struggled to 
recover in the ensuing 5 years. In this context, this paper has reported on research 
which explored managerial perceptions and practices in these employee-owned firms 
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in order to reveal the extent to which and the ways in which they have been able to 
enact regeneration strategies so as to achieve sustainability. 
 
As noted, attempted departures from the established norms of the capitalist firm have 
been regarded as prone to a range of problems originating from their deliberate 
deviance (Meister, 1974, 1984; Ben-Ner, 1984; Bonin, Jones et al. 1993). In that 
context, we explored how the senior managers in JLP and Eroski were responding. 
We found that many of the managers in the two organizations discussed in this paper 
rejected the polarities of the degeneration literature. Instead, they contended that ‘with 
the right management’, a way can be found to facilitate customer benefit and 
commercial success from the increased commitment and engagement of employees 
who can be persuaded that they are working for themselves. We revealed how both 
retailers had learned how to articulate a compelling conviction that commercial 
advantage could be gained from the democratic elements. In the case of JLP the 
managers had even learned how to leverage that difference externally to create and 
sustain a positive market image. 
 
On the basis of this analysis it cannot of course be claimed that there are no tensions 
between commerciality and the principles of mutuals; there clearly are. But, what can 
be claimed is that in these two co-owned businesses, this tension has been managed so 
that it is shifted from a zero-sum relationship to a mutually supportive relationship 
with positive linkages between structures and processes of accountability and 
commercial endeavour. The two cases also reveal that while the co-owned model can 
be a source of competitive advantage it is by no means an automatic causal 
connection.  
 
An intricate picture emerges. Changes to some aspects of the mutual model 
underpinning the two cases have occurred. And in both organisations there are 
internal as well as external critics who see the amendments as attacks on the mutual 
principles and structures. In fact, many of the observations made by interviewed 
managers in Eroski over its expansion period (sharp reduction of the percentage of 
members; priority of economic goals; passivity and loss of interest by members; etc.) 
are almost identical to the degeneration processes in Meister’s (1974, 1984) third 
stage of the degeneration life cycle. Similarly, we also found signs of degeneration in 
JLP, as the employment of a growing rate of non members, and a growing 
concentration of decision-making in management hands and a weakening of the 
power of the Council attest. But, it is by no means clear that these changes in both 
companies represent across-the-board dilution of mutual principles. As shown, there 
were periodic attempts at renewal. 
 
Our study corroborates and deepens the findings of the regeneration literature 
(Batstone, 1983; Cornforth, et al. 1988; Estrin and Jones, 1992; Stryjan, 1994; 
Cornforth, 1995; Hernandez, 2006), showing that long term survival can be 
accompanied by a resurgence of democratic features, principles and practices. In both 
cases, it is evident from our data that management is engaged in healthy, explicit, 
active and vigorous internal debate about the achievement of the appropriate interplay 
between commercial success and the maintenance of the distinctive underpinning 
principles. In the case of Eroski, this debate has led to a significant retreat from 
previous policies of centralisation and the employment of non-members. In JLP, it has 
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led to reforms in management and employment practices and in governance 
structures.   
 
The dilemma suggested by the degeneration thesis would appear to be neither 
inescapable nor insurmountable. Our cases suggest that the equilibrium will be 
dynamic and prone in an ongoing way to over-enthusiastic pressure from the 
commercially focused, or from defensive sallies from the cooperative 
fundamentalists. We suggest that this ongoing dynamic between the 'modern 
managers' and the defenders of traditional tenets of cooperative and co-owned ways 
of organising and managing is healthy and productive.  
 
The paper shows that managing these co-owned enterprises is not easy. Many 
cooperatives less favourably endowed have failed. There are numerous dangers: over-
zealous modernising managers not fully steeped in the principles of the mutual often 
neglect to understand or respect them; a focus on commercial success could lead to 
commercially sensible decisions which dilute these principles; it is tempting to look 
for ways to avoid the scrutiny and questioning of democratic representatives. But 
interestingly, JLP managers were adamant that the success of the organisation was not 
at the expense of the model but was a result of the model. In Eroski, managers said 
that they expected that the model and the cooperative regeneration practices will help 
in the economic recovery of the company. 
 
A contribution of the present study to the cooperative degeneration-regeneration 
literature is the finding in both enterprises of a relation between sustained economic 
success and member passivity. Long periods of economic success can generate 
complacency among members who consider past success as a signal of good 
management and reduce their control over business decisions. In the opposite 
direction, cooperative regeneration can be sometimes fuelled by poor economic 
results as happened recently in the case of Eroski. Apart from active policies aimed to 
regenerate cooperative life, informants consider that the economic crisis in the post 
2008 period played an important role breathing life back into cooperative practices, 
increasing the desire of members to be informed, to attend meetings and actively take 
part in decision making committees and governing bodies. 
 
The main learning point from these cases is this: managers in both organizations 
suggest not only that commerciality and mutuality can be mutually supportive but that 
the real key to success resides in their insistence on not being satisfied that this 
balance has been achieved successfully. In fact, this balance is dynamic and following 
the paradoxical perspective proposed by Hernandez (2006), we find that JLP and 
Eroski are neither fully democratic nor oligarchic but sites of continuous and 
unresolved contestation between oligarchic and democratic tensions. JLP managers 
worry that new business formats may stretch or even breach the core principles, and 
they discuss this and worry about it. Eroski managers, observing the increasing 
centralisation and use of non-member employers are seeking to reverse these trends. 
Recognition that these kinds of balance are key, inherently unstable, and requiring of 
constant attention, is a fundamental lesson. 
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